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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
concern with potestative conditions, serious consideration and
mutuality of obligations is an ultimate concern with the ques-
tion of whether the particular stipulation not to compete is
opposed to the public policy forbidding unreasonable restraint
of trade.21
Charles W. Howard
PRACTICE--SURVIVAL OF ACTION
Plaintiff was injured in a fall in defendant's theater and
instituted suit to recover damages. Judgment was rendered in
the district court several years later denying recovery. Plaintiff
took a devolutive appeal, but pending the appeal she died. Her
husband, nearly five years later, petitioned the court of appeal
to be made plaintiff. This the court of appeal refused to do, but
remanded the case to the trial court to receive evidence of the
husband's capacity to prosecute the appeal.' Defendant applied
to the Supreme Court for a writ of review, contending that judg-
ment should have been rendered dismissing the husband's peti-
tion. Held, that since the wife had been cast in judgment in the
district court, her right of action had not become a property right
capable of passing to the husband by inheritance. "The only
right to which the husband succeeded was the statutory survival
of action under Article 2315 which had to be exercised in accord-
ance with the terms of the statute. .. ." The court expressed a
belief that Act 239 of 1946 had been impliedly repealed by Act 333
of 1948, amending and reenacting Article 2315 of the Louisiana
Civil Code. Gabriel v. United Theatres, Inc., 221 La. 219, 59 So. 2d
127 (1952).
In the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, the corresponding article
to the present Article 2315 contained no provision for survival of
actions in tort after the death of the injured person.2 By amend-
ment to this article in 18553 the tort action of a deceased survives
in favor of certain designated beneficiaries, who may bring the
action of the deceased in their own right. But this right is limited
by a prescriptive period of one year. The court has always inter-
21. See Shreveport Laundries, Inc. v. Teagle, 139 So. 563, 567 (La. App.
1932), where the court in referring to the Blanchard case said, "It is con-
ceded that the court could have justifiably held the contract invalid as being
against public policy."
1. Gabriel v. United Theatres, 50 So. 2d 514 (La. App. 1951).
2. Art. 2294, La. Civil Code of 1825.
3. La. Act 233 of 1855, amending Art. 2294, Civil Code of 1825.
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preted this statutory survival of actions strictly, as being "in
derogation of a common right. ' 4
In Chivers v. Roger5 the court held that where a beneficiary
under Article 23156 died before definitive judgment in the court
of original jurisdiction, the action abated, since it was said to be
strictly personal and not heritable. An earlier case7 had allowed
continued prosecution by the heirs of a beneficiary when there
had been favorable judgment in the trial court. The rationale of
this decision was that the judgment was a property right and
therefore heritable. Comment concerning the court's interpreta-
tion of the law in the Chivers case has generally been unfavor-
able.8 However, the case was consistently followed, but fortun-
ately its doctrine was restricted to the very factual situation of
the original case.9
4. The courts of Louisiana often hold that statutes in derogation of a
common right are to be strictly construed. Reed v. Warren, 172 La. 1082, 136
So. 59 (1931); Kerner v. Trans-Mississippi Terminal R.R., 158 La. 853, 104 So.
740 (1925); Flash v. Louisiana Western Ry. Co., 137 La. 352, 68 So. 636 (1915);
Chivers v. Roger, 50 La. Ann. 57, 23 So. 100 (1898), or in derogation of a
"common or civil right," Miller v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 42 So. 2d
328 (La. App. 1949). This expression appears to be a paraphrase of the com-
mon law maxim: Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed. This rule of statutory construction, which resulted until quite
recent times in a very strict construction of statutes in common law juris-
dictions, is completely out of harmony with the civilian judicial techniques.
5. 50 La. Ann. 57, 23 So. 100 (1898).
6. La. Civil Code of 1870.
7. Vincent v. Sharp, 9 La. Ann. 463 (1854), followed in Casteluco v.
Cloverlands Dairy Products Co., 165 La. 606, 115 So. 796 (1927); Gallagher v.
Ricketts, 187 So. 351 (La. App. 1939), annulled on other grounds, 191 So. 713
(La. App. 1939); Foy v. Little, 197 So. 313 (La. App. 1939), noted in 15 Tulane
L. Rev. 135 (1940).
8. The principal causes of disagreement with the Chivers case are Art.
945, La. Civil Code of 1870, and Art. 21, La. Code of Practice of 1870. Article
945 provides: "The second effect of this right [heir being considered as
having succeeded to the deceased from the moment of death] is to authorize
the heir to institute all the actions, even possessory ones, which the deceased
had a right to institute, and to prosecute those already commenced. 'For the
heir, in everything, represents the deceased, and is of full right in his place
as well for his rights as his obligations." (Italics supplied.) Article 21 of the
Code of Practice of 1870 provides: "Actions do not abate by the death of one
of the parties after answer filed." Blanchard, J., dissenting in Chivers v.
Roger distinguished between a right in posse and a right in esse. A trans-
missible right in esse is created by the filing of an answer to suit according
to the above quoted article. See Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrong-
ful Death at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 Tulane L. Rev.
201 (1932); Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for
Wrongful Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 Tulane L. Rev. 386 (1942).
9. Foy v. Little, 197 So. 313 (La. App. 1939); Hardtner v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 189 So. 365 (La. App. 1939); Williams v. Campbell, 185 So. 683
(La. App. 1938); Castelluccio v. Cloverland Dairy Products Co., Inc., 165 La.
606, 115 So. 796 (1927); Payne v. Georgetown Lumber Co., Ltd., 117 La. 983,
42 So. 475 (1906); Durbridge v. State, 117 La. 841, 42 So. 337 (1906).
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Along with provisions of the law of successions l Article 21
of the Code of Practice" was read out of the law when dealing
with facts similar to the Chivers case. That article provided:
"Actions do not abate by the death of one of the parties after
answer filed."'12 In 1946, legislation was enacted which apparently
was designed to overrule Chivers v. Roger.1  Act 239 of that year
provided in part that: "There are no exceptions to the rule that
an action does not abate by the death of one of the parties thereto
after issue joined therein." 14 The first opportunity to construe this
act was presented to the court in the instant case.
Following closely the prior jurisprudence, the court in the
Gabriel case held that since the plaintiff had been cast in the
district court, she "had no proprietary rights to transmit. The
only right to which the husband succeeded was the statutory
survival of action under Article 2315, which had to be exercised
in accordance with the terms of the statute."'15 Neither litigant
had urged Act 239 of 1946,16 which had been reenacted as a part
of the 1950 Revised Statutes.1 7 Nevertheless the court stated that
it would take notice of its existence. It then expressed the belief
that this act had been impliedly repealed by Act 333 of 1948,
which amended and reenacted Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil
Code.
It would seem that the court erred in resurrecting the ghost
of Chivers v. Roger, for the 1948 amendment to Article 2315 con-
cerned only the beneficiaries created by adoption.' 8 Furthermore,
there is a provision in Act 239 that no act of the Legislature here-
tofore passed or hereafter passed should be construed as making
an exception to the act unless an intent to so do is specifically
10. See note 8, supra.
11. Ibid.
12. Art. 21, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
13. McMahon, Louisiana Legislation of 1946, 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 23,
36-38 (1946); Comment, 4 Loyola L. Rev. 75 (1947). In addition to overruling
Chivers v. Roger, the act somewhat extended Article 21, since joinder of issue
encompasses more than the mere filing of an answer.
14. La. Act 239 of 1946, La. R.S. 1950, 13:3349.
15. This right had prescribed.
16. La. Act 239 of 1946, La. R.S. 1950, 13:3349.
17. Ibid.
18. La. Act 333 of 1948 amended Art. 2315, La. Civil Code of 1870, to make
children given in adoption beneficiaries of equal status with legitimate chil-
dren and adopted children. It also provided that the right of action shall
extend in favor of the blood parents to the exclusion of the adoptive parents
if the adopted person was a major at the time of adoption.
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stated.19 Although one Legislature cannot bind a future one,
certainly it can lay down rules as to how its acts are to be con-
strued in relation to any future law. The introductory articles of
the Civil Code contain several "canons of construction" 2 similar
to those in this act, and they certainly have been applied to sub-
sequent amendments of the code.
In 1950 Act 239 of 1946 was reenacted as Section 3349, Title 13,
of the Revised Statutes.2 1 Therefore, even if Act 239 was im-
pliedly repealed by the 1948 amendment to Article 2315 of the
code, as held in the Gabriel case, the 1950 reenactment was the
last expression of legislative will and certainly should have gov-
erned. Since the 1950 Revised Statutes had the effect of new
legislation, 22 there can be no doubt that at the time of their adop-
tion they constituted the latest expressions of legislative will.
Conclusion
Although it would seem that the Chivers v. Roger doctrine
should no longer be the law of Louisiana, the issue is again in
doubt. Perhaps it is significant that the provisions of the 1956
Revised Statutes were not urged or argued by counsel in the
19. La. Act 239 of 1946 contained certain maxims of construction which
are found in the last three sections of that act:
"Section 3. That no act of the Legislature heretofore passed shall here-
after be construed as making an exception to said rule.
"Section 4. That there shall be a presumption in the construction of Acts
of the Legislature hereafter passed that no such Act makes any exception to
said rule.
"Section 5. That no Act of the Legislature hereafter passed shall ever be
construed as making an exception to said rule unless such Act specifically
and specially makes an exception thereto."
20. Arts. 13-19, La. Civil Code of 1870. See, for example, Art. 13, La. Civil
Code of 1870: "When a law is clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter
of it is not to be disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." See
McMahon, Louisiana Legislation of 1946, 7 LOuISIANA LAw REviEw 23, 36-38
(1946).
21. La. R.S. 1950, 13:3349: "There are no exceptions to the rule that an
action does not abate by the death of one of the parties thereto after issue
joined therein. This Section shall apply to all actions now pending as well as
those which may be hereafter instituted. No act of the legislature heretofore
passed, nor any acts hereafter passed shall be construed as making an excep-
tion to this rule, unless such act specifically and specially makes an exception
thereto."
22. Although in drafting the Revised Statutes of 1950 the Law Institute
had no authority to change existing law, in case of conflict between a source
of the 1950 statutes and a later conflicting law enacted before 1950, the statu-
tory provisions contained in the Revised Statutes should prevail. In a recent
case construing the effect of the Revised Statutes of 1950 the court said:
"... the legislature ... adopted the [Revised Statutes of 1950] as a body and
enacted them into law" and "there is no doubt that as so adopted and
enacted they became the law of the State as it presently exists." City of
Alexandria v. LaCombe, 220 La. 618, 627, 57 So. 2d 206, 209 (1952). Accord:
Duke 'Power Co. v. Somerset County Board of Taxation, 125 N.J.L. 431, 15 A.
2d 460 (1940).
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Gabriel case. What would be the fate of a case involving similar
facts if again presented to the court is, of course, conjectural. It is,
however, the opinion of the writer that the express and unequiv-
ocal language of R.S. 13:3349 would prevail and that once again
there would be no exceptions to the rule that actions do not abate
after issue joined.
Charles C. Gray
